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Current Air Force supply doctrine requires the management of large numbers of 
spare parts in Mobility Readiness Spares Packages (MRSPs). The MRSPs are usually 
designed to support deployed aircraft for the first 30 days of a conflict, and can be quite 
large. When units from several bases deploy to the same operating location, they each 
bring their full MRSP. This results in a large logistics footprint that may be reduced by 
taking a system-level approach. 
This thesis examined the impact of centralized MRSP management on kit size and 
cost. The Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM) computer program was used to evaluate 
MRSPs for F-15C, C-17A, and B-52H aircraft deploying in both the traditional manner 
and with customized MRSPs from a centralized facility. 
The results of the ASM analysis indicate there is a significant cost and size 
savings when MRSPs are customized for the total number of aircraft deployed to a region 
of conflict. While the size of the savings varied between aircraft and flying hour profiles, 
MRSPs from the centralized facility always provided the same level of support for less 
cost. The results show the Air Force could release spare parts locked up in standardized 
MRSPs and relieve some of the current spares shortages without degrading unit 
readiness. 
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF CENTRALIZING MANAGEMENT OF MOBILITY 
READINESS SPARES PACKAGE ASSETS 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
The United States military is facing a world that is changing more rapidly than 
ever before. With the Cold War over and the elimination of the Soviet threat, America's 
armed forces are no longer able to point their collective fingers and say "There's the 
enemy, let's start planning." Congress and the American people have proclaimed a 
"peace dividend" and have scaled back funding of defense programs and budgets. At the 
same time, they have set the standards to which the military must size itself and have 
called for ever-increasing involvement in military operations other than warfare 
(MOOTW). These small-scale contingencies and humanitarian relief efforts actually task 
our forces more than a major theater war (MTW) ever would (AMSP: 1.4.2). 
An aging fleet of heavy airlift aircraft, primarily the C-141 Starlifter, has put new 
constraints on the Air Force's ability to deploy forces anywhere in the world at a 
moment's notice. In a June 2000 report, the GAO stated that the Air Force could not 
meet the requirements for a two major theater war scenario because there is an estimated 
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29% shortfall in cargo airlift capacity (GAO report, 2000: 5). The C-17 Globemaster III 
is the replacement for the C-141. While it carries substantially more cargo than the C- 
141 and can land on unimproved runaways, Congress has funded only 120 C-17 aircraft 
to replace 266 C-141s. The theoretical airlift capacity remains about equal, but the loss 
of flexibility inherent in possessing only half the airframes means the remaining aircraft 
must be used more efficiently. 
Mobility Readiness Spares Packages 
Most conflicts in the world occur far from peacetime operating locations. When 
Air Force units are called up, a massive logistics effort by air, ground, and sea moves the 
units into forward locations where they must be supported until the conflict is resolved. 
The Air Force supports the initial deployment by sending spares in standardized 
containers. The initial cache of spares is designed to support the deployed aircraft until a 
resupply pipeline can be established. In the past, this time period was assumed to be 30 
days at the most. In reality, advances in transportation technology and the rise of rapid 
air transport have reduced the pipeline setup time significantly. 
Current Air Force supply doctrine requires the management of large numbers of 
spare parts in Mobility Readiness Spares Packages (MRSPs). The kits, as they are also 
known, are usually configured to support a given number of aircraft for a set amount of 
time, usually 30 days. They are designed with the assumption that no resupply takes 
place during the first 30 days. The packages can be quite large, with between 15 and 20 
conexes (large containers for parts) plus wheel and tire pallets. 
There is a general belief that too many parts are stored in the MRSPs. The author 
witnessed this during Operation PHOENIX SCORPION IV (Air Mobility Command's 
support of the deployment of US forces to the Persian Gulf), in which a large C-17 kit 
was deployed for nearly a month and had only a few parts issued during the entire 
operation. The resulting large logistics footprint places a strain on already overburdened 
airlift capacity, so the current direction of research is to determine how to reduce the 
number of parts necessary for the initial deployment. The base-level maintenance, 
inventory, and personnel support requirements are also significant when maintaining 
large numbers of assets ready to deploy in less than 24 hours. 
MRSPs possess a higher fill priority than regular peacetime operating stock (POS) 
assets at base level. When a reparable asset arrives on base, the base supply system 
checks for requirements and fills them based on the priorities assigned to the backorders. 
Outstanding backorders for the maintenance organizations are satisfied first, then MRSP 
backorders, and finally POS requirements (AFM 23-110: 2001, V2P2C9.40.3.4). Often, 
there are not enough assets to meet all the requirements due to the previously mentioned 
funding shortfalls. The result is that bases are forced to "live out of the kits," and base- 
level POS requirements remain empty. The situation causes constant shuffling of assets 
between the MRSP location and the flightline delivery location, and increases the 
probability of inventory inaccuracies and longer delivery times. 
Reparable Asset Pipeline 
The Air Force uses a multi-echelon inventory system to manage reparable assets. 
A multi-echelon system is one in which assets are warehoused in a hierarchy of locations. 
Reparable assets are those items that are economically feasible to repair rather than 
dispose of when they become unserviceable through use. In general, reparable assets are 
expensive and thus are in much shorter supply than consumable items. The Air Force 
attempts to manage reparable assets in a way that balances inventory levels with desired 
aircraft availability levels for a set budget. 
Reparable assets enter the Air Force inventory through acquisition channels, and 
are managed by depots located throughout the U.S. The depots support bases with 
aircraft that use the items by allocating the assets in a way that maximizes total system 
aircraft availability. Assets may be stored at the depot only, at bases only, or in a 
combination of depot and base supply stock. Unserviceable assets are returned to the 
depot for repair or disposal. This return loop makes the model a cyclic one, where 
inventory is not lost or renewed, except in extreme cases where an asset becomes 
economically unfeasible to repair. The demand in cyclic reparable models is driven by 
failure and repair events (Diaz and Fu, 2000: 7). 
Items of Evaluation 
The individual indicators Air Force managers examine are MRSP fill rates, Not- 
Mission-Capable-Supply (NMCS) rates, and aircraft availability. A fill rate is expressed 
as a percentage of the parts in the MRSP compared to what the MRSP is authorized to 
have. There are no mandated lower limits on fill rates during peacetime, but resupply to 
the kits is always a higher priority than regular operating stock at a base. The NMCS rate 
is the percentage of aircraft that are grounded due to lack of a specific part or parts. 
Aircraft availability is the final measure of all logistics activity, and is the percentage of 
aircraft ready to fly and fight (Larvick, 2000: 13). 
MRSPs are usually "robusted" before deployments, meaning they are inventoried 
and then stocked to the highest fill rate possible using parts from other, non-deploying 
kits. So, while the average fill rate during peacetime may be low, they are usually 
deployed with a higher fill rate than normal. Fill rate should not be the only measure of 
MRSP effectiveness because there are times when critical assets are not available in the 
kit and the aircraft may be grounded for parts, even if the MRSP has a 99% fill rate 
(Larvick, 2000:13). For this reason, the newer models used for analyzing kit 
effectiveness use aircraft availability as the final measure of customer service. 
Issue 
Several methods of reducing the size of MRSPs have attracted attention. They 
include reducing the MRSP resupply pipeline time, improving in-transit visibility, and 
establishing Consolidated Intermediate Repair Facilities (CIRFs). The 30-day 
configuration is a Cold War era paradigm that is currently being reevaluated. The 
question many supply mangers are asking today is what is the most effective way to 
allocate spares to Mobility Readiness Spares Packages (MRSPs or kits) supporting AEF 
deployments? This thesis will address a new answer: that of centralizing the kits at 
regional centers and then building up focused MRSPs when deployments occur. The 
following figures illustrate the differences between the current and proposed modes of 
operation: 
f       Depot     \^ 
V       Repair       J Unserviceable Süares 
Figure 1: Traditional MRSP Management Model 
Figure 2: Proposed MRSP Management Model 
The basic premise behind the concept is simple: if multiple squadrons of identical 
aircraft deploy to the same Forward Operating Location (FOL), they would normally take 
a standard MRSP from each base. The FOL would then have multiple squadrons of 
aircraft with multiple full MRSPs. For example, if two 24-aircraft squadrons from 
different bases deploy to the same FOL, they would take two full MRSPs in support. 
During the Gulf War in 1990-91, a 24-plane fighter squadron required the equivalent of 
20 C-141 loads to deploy (Snyder, et al, 1998:16). The MRSP is not the total load, but is 
a significant portion of the footprint. Forty C-141 loads would be required to deploy the 
hypothetical two squadrons. When they arrived at the FOL, the number of hours it would 
take to set up and the amount of storage space the MRSPs require would be considerable. 
The number of aircraft at deployed locations today is small; several 6 to 12 
aircraft units deployed throughout the theater are becoming common. A CIRF is set up at 
a central point and a main support warehouse is established to feed parts to the dispersed 
units. This is a change from the large, 50+ aircraft deployments the Air Force has 
historically deployed. 
Research Question 
This thesis will determine what, if any, savings can be gained from centralized 
management of MRSP assets. The premise behind this statement is that of economies of 
scope: a single MRSP designed to support 48 aircraft should be smaller than two MRSPs 
designed to support 24 aircraft each. 
Investigative Questions 
The following investigative questions have been developed to direct the research 
and help answer the thesis question. 
1. How does the Air Force currently determine MRSP requirements? 
2. What model/models are used to build up MRSPs? 
3. What are the relevant theories about centralized inventory management? 
4. Are any other military services using centralized management to reduce costs 
and/or logistics footprint? 
5. What is the effect of customized MRSP creation at a central location? 
Scope 
The research will examine only the effects of centralizing the management of 
MRSPs for F-15C, C-17A, and B-52H aircraft. No reduction in pipeline times will be 
assumed for the scenarios. That research is an ongoing effort by numerous others and 
will not be addressed here. The thesis will not discuss the political ramifications of 
removing local base MRSP assets. Base operations routinely use MRSP assets for day- 
to-day flight operations, and removing them, even for the purpose of returning more 
assets to regular POS, would need higher headquarters' approval. This thesis will only 
evaluate the potential savings that may result from such a decision. 
Summary 
This chapter has provided a general introduction to the topic and defined the 
research questions to be answered in the study. Chapter two is a literature review, and 
will further explore previous work and explain some concepts vital to the understanding 
of the thesis. Chapter three will explain the methodology used and the operation of the 
Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM). Chapter four will discuss the results and any 
conclusions to be made. Finally, chapter five will wrap up the thesis with a final 
discussion and any further research suggestions. 
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II.  Chapter 2-Literature Review 
Military forces throughout the ages have recognized that an army without good 
logistics support is destined to fight a very short war. This literature review will provide 
some background needed to understand the ideas behind the thesis. The review will first 
discuss the progression of inventory management techniques from simple ones to more 
complex dynamic, multi-echelon models. It will then examine MRSP characteristics and 
factors that affect the ASM computations. It will finish with a discussion of centralized 
inventory management theory and a look at a Navy program that uses centralized assets 
to improve support. 
Inventory Management Techniques 
The task of reducing the amount of inventory necessary to achieve a desired level 
of availability has prompted many studies. This section will start with the most basic 
methods and models and proceed to the more complicated and recent models. The 
relevance of mathematical models to this study precludes the inclusion of other methods 
such as neural networks and queuing models. 
Simple Pipeline. The simple single base repair pipeline consists of four components 
through which the reparable asset passes. When a part on an aircraft fails, it is removed 
and sent to through the base repair cycle process to the repair shop. At the same time, a 
serviceable part, if available, is sent to the aircraft for installation. Figure 3 shows this 
simple model and the path a part takes through it. 







Figure 3: Simple Pipeline (Arostegui, 2000) 
For this model, there are two major factors we are concerned with. The first is the Daily 
Demand Rate (DDR), and the second is the Repair Cycle Time (RCT). The DDR is 
simply the number of demands an item receives per day. For example, if the base shows 
the number of orders for a quarter is 65, then the DDR for the part is 65/120, or .542. 
The repair cycle time is determined by the base repair facility, and may be different for 
each part. In the simple model, no parts are ever condemned (the system is conservative). 
In addition, we assume every part is essential, so a part missing downs the aircraft. No 
cannibalization activities are permitted, so each aircraft has only one part removed. 
With the model defined, we now turn to calculating the number of spare parts we 
expect to be in the pipeline on average. This is simply the DDR multiplied by the RCT. 
If we assume the RCT is five days, then the Pipeline Quantity (PLQ) is .542*5, or 2.71 
parts in the repair pipeline at any given moment in time. This model is very simplistic, 
and does not represent the majority of inventory systems operating in the real world. It 
does provide a good starting point from which to build a suitably applicable model. The 
vast majority of inventory systems are multi-echelon systems, with multiple levels of 
inventory. 
10 
Multi-echelon Networks. Clark states that multi-echelon theory is "concerned with a 
variety of inventory problems involving two or more interrelated supply or production 
facilities (Clark, 1972: 621)." Many inventory systems in the civilian sector involve the 
flow of consumables from factories to distribution centers and then on to points of 
consumption. This common type of network is referred to as an "arborescent" or 
inverted tree structure (Clark, 1972: 622). 
FACTORY 
WEST CENTRAL 
5 7?- 6V- 6V- öV-<y- <fc' 







Figure 4: Arborescent Structure (Clark: 1972) 
It is important to note that the above structure may change for every item. A different 
factory may produce the item, or an entirely different distribution network may be in 
place. 
The levels within the arborescent structure are generally referred to as echelons, 
so any network with numerous levels is called a multi-echelon network. While this 
works for consumable items with no return loop, Clark argues that the nomenclature is 
too restrictive to be used in a general sense (Clark, 1972: 622). However, the general 
trend in the literature suggests that most authors are comfortable with using the term 
"multi-echelon" when discussing any network with more than one level. 
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A simple Air Force example of a multi-echelon network involves the addition of a 
depot to our first model, as shown in Figure 5 below: 










Figure 5: Simple Multi-Echelon Network (Arostegui, 2000) 
In addition to the base repair pipeline, the network now has a repair and resupply 
pipeline to and from the second echelon, the depot. Items that cannot be repaired at the 
base repair shop are sent into the depot repair cycle. The time it takes an item to move 
from the base to the depot is called the retrograde time (RET). The depot repair shop will 
take some amount of time to repair the item, which is the depot repair time (DRT). At 
the same time an item leaves the base, the base orders a replacement from the depot using 
an (S-l, S) inventory model where a part is ordered for every unserviceable part that 
leaves the base. If the depot has assets the time it takes for the order to arrive at the 
depot, be processed, and then be shipped to the base is known as the order and ship time 
(OST). 
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To determine the amount of stock in the pipeline for the above model, the percent 
base repair (PBR) needs to be calculated. This is simply the number of items repaired 
this station (RTS) divided by the total number of demands for the item. The base repair 
cycle quantity is then: 
RCQ = DDRxRCTxPBR  (1) 
The OST quantity is simply the DDR multiplied by the number of demands sent to the 
depot (1-PBR) times the OST: 
OSTQ = DDR(\ - PBR) x OST (2) 
The depot RCQ is a modification of the base RCQ that adjusts for the percent of items 
sent to the depot: 
DRCQ = DDR(\-PBR)xDRT (3) 
The retrograde pipeline quantity is found with the following equation: 
RPQ = DDR(l-PBR)xRET (4) 
Finally, the average number of items in the total pipeline (the total system requirement 
(TSR)) at any given time is the sum of the individual pipeline quantities: 
TSR = BaseRCQ + DepotRCQ + OSTQ + DRCQ + RPQ (5) 
The model above can be made even more complex by adding condemnation rates 
or other variables to the mix. One item to note is that the quantities used are generally 
averages taken over several periods, and usually vary over time. To compensate, a safety 
level is usually established using some pre-specified formula. In addition, this model 
must be applied to every item in the inventory and seeks only to optimize the service 
level of a particular item instead of the entire system. For that, a system-wide multi- 
echelon inventory management technique must be used. 
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Types of Multi-echelon Models. There are many ways of formulating multi-echelon 
models in response to the different data types and behaviors of the network being 
modeled. Clark outlines six dichotomies that he says help distinguish the various types: 
Table 1: Types of Multi-echelon Models (Adapted from Clark, 1972) 
Deterministic Stochastic 
External demands at each activity are 
known in advance 
Demands known within a given probability 
distribution (or conditional distribution) 
Single-Product Multiple-Product 
Deals only with one product at a time, 
ignores possible interactions 
Deals with more than one products 
simultaneously, attempts to optimize based 
on one or more criteria such as budget 
Stationary Nonstationary 
Parameters defining external demands 
considered to be independent of time 
Parameters defining external demands may 
change over time 
Continuous Review Periodic Review 
Opportunities to review stock position and 
implement policies occur continuously 
Opportunities to review stock position and 
implement policies occur at discrete points 
Consumable Product Reparable Product 
All issued items are permanent losses to the 
system 
Some or all of the items issued are 
regenerated as items that may be reissued 
Backlog No Backlog 
Unsatisfied demands are retained and 
satisfied from later resupply 
Unsatisfied demands are not retained and 
are assumed lost to the system 
Using Clark's criteria, the models previously examined are deterministic, single- 
product models with stationary demand. They are subject to continuous review, deal 
with reparable items only, and may or may not consider backorders. In a more recent 
article, Diaz and Fu uphold Clark's taxonomy, substituting the terms "cyclic" and 
"acyclic" for reparable and consumable types of flow, respectively (Diaz and Fu, 2000: 
8). 
Probabilistic Models. It is generally assumed (though not usually specifically stated) 
that a system-perspective model performs better than a single-item model. In 1968, 
Sherbrooke published an article in Operations Research titled "METRIC: A Multi- 
Echelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control." Diaz and Fu call METRIC "the most 
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influential model by far (Diaz and Fu, 2000: 9)." They state that METRIC was 
interesting for two main reasons. The first was that Sherbrooke used exchange curves of 
system availability versus investment value of spares, instead of finding a single 
"optimal" value. The second reason is that he allocated spares based on a global basis. 
Further research by Muckstadt and Thomas showed that simple multi-echelon models 
such as METRIC do yield better results than a simple naive local optimization 
(Muckstadt and Thomas, 1980: 494). This section will provide an overview of the 
METRIC model and some of the more advanced developments based on METRIC. 
Diaz and Fu (2000,10) describe key relationships they say form the basis for 
analyzing multi-echelon models for repairable items. They break down the process into 
three general steps: 
1. Determine the distributions for the parts population through the various 
components of the system 
2. Combine the distributions to determine backorder distributions 
3. Determine availability from the backorder distributions 
In addition, they consider a system of a single base and a single depot, each with a 
specific target of spares. They represent the system as a network of discrete elements, 
including: 
1. a stock of working-level parts (installed parts on aircraft) 
2. a base-to-repair facility pipeline for failed parts 
3. a repair facility 
4. a depot storage facility stocking more spares 
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5. a depot-to-base pipeline 
6. a base storage facility stocking spares (base supply) 
Using this basic framework, Sherbrooke developed the METRIC model, which was 
quickly adopted by the military as a means of maximizing aircraft availability at a given 
budget level. We now discuss the METRIC model in detail. 
METRIC. METRIC is an extension of the single-site model with two echelons of repair 
and resupply. It adds multiple bases to the system. It is a single-indenture model, which 
means that each part is a line replaceable unit (LRU) with no shop replaceable units 
(SRU). This simplifies the model but is not especially accurate because many reparable 
parts have smaller reparable parts installed on them (SRUs), and a lack of SRUs can 
significantly impact repair times. METRIC is a stationary, stochastic model that 
addresses multi-echelon, multi-item, multi-location systems. Its goal is to minimize 
expected backorders (EBO) (Arostegui, 2000). 
METRIC uses several assumptions to make the computational effort less tedious. 
For base repairs, the decision to repair does not depend on the stock levels or workload. 
This means that if the base has the capability to repair a failed item, it will do so. 
Maintenance workload is not a factor. In terms of resupply, METRIC assumes bases 
receive assets from the depot only. No lateral resupply from other bases is allowed. This 
assumption makes sense because stock replenishment actions from the depot should be 
routine. Lateral resupply involves additional costs that are not easily incorporated into 
the model, and in practice lateral resupply is only a small fraction of the bases' business. 
The stockage policy at every echelon is an (S-l, S) policy (also known as a one-for-one 
policy). There is no batching of units for repair and no batching of resupply requests. 
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Because the items exhibit low annual demand and high unit cost, the classic economic 
order quantity (EOQ) formula would yield a recommended order quantity of one. 
Because the model is stationary, METRIC assumes that the number of aircraft operated 
and their flying hours will remain fairly constant over the near-term. METRIC also 
assumes the system is conservative and therefore does not account for condemnations of 
assets. 
One very important aspect of the METRIC model is that it minimizes the 
expected backorders for the entire system. Therefore, a base backorder lasting 10 days is 
treated just a seriously as 10 one-day backorders. This may or may not be a good 
characteristic, depending on the commander's perspective. Is it better to have 10 aircraft 
down for one day, or one aircraft down for 10? The final assumption for METRIC is that 































Figure 6 METRIC Network (Arostegui, 2000) 
Mod-METRIC. In 1973, Muckstadt published an article in Management Science titled 
"A Model for a Multi-Item, Multi-Echelon, Multi-Indenture Inventory System." In it, 
Muckstadt expanded the METRIC model to accommodate the effects of SRU backorders 
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on the system. Again, the overall goal was to minimize expected backorders. The figure 
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Figure 7: Mod-METRIC Network (Arostegui, 2000) 
As shown in the diagram, Mod-METRIC adds a pipeline segment for base repair 
of SRUs and for the depot resupply of SRUs to the bases. In addition, base repair of an 
LRU may be delayed/impacted due to the lack of an SRU. One of the more important 
concepts behind Mod-METRIC is while the lack of a serviceable LRU grounds an 
aircraft, the lack of a serviceable SRU delays the LRU's repair. 
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Mod-METRIC was originally designed for the F-15's two F-100 engines. These 
engines are modular, with modules such as the inlet/fan module, the core engine, the fan 
drive turbine module, and the augmenter/exhaust nozzle module. When an engine fails, 
the engine is removed and replaced with a serviceable engine. The failed engine is then 
tested and the offending module is replaced. The module may be repaired at the base or 
the depot. In extreme cases, the entire engine is sent to the depot for repair. Despite 
being developed for this specific purpose, Mod-METRIC is generalizeable to many 
applications involving both LRUs and SRUs. 
Mod-METRIC uses the basic METRIC assumptions and then adds several of its 
own. The model assumes that LRUs are expensive and directly degrade the mission 
when they fail, so the system should have a PBR close to 100%. In contrast, SRUs are 
relatively inexpensive and are remove and replace items. Some PBR for them is 
acceptable, but the system can more readily afford to have extra stock of the items and 
fill the depot repairable pipeline with them. Mod-METRIC assumes that every LRU 
failure is the result of just one SRU failure, with no "cascading failures" allowed. 
Finally, an SRU belongs to just one LRU (Arostegui, 2000). 
In 1985, Graves published a paper that criticized the METRIC models for their 
use of the Poisson distribution for demands. He and others found that both METRIC and 
Mod-METRIC understated actual EBO values. Sherbrooke agreed, stating: 
"When the METRIC model was developed, it was clear that it understated base 
backorders. In most cases the error was not large, and the simplicity of METRIC 
seemed to overshadow its lack of precision (Sherbrooke, 1986: 311)." 
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Slay in 1980 developed the VARI-METRIC model, which resulted in a ten-fold 
improvement over METRIC results. Using the model, Graves found that METRIC 
differed by at least one unit in 11% of the cases he examined. VARI-METRIC differed 
in only 1% of the cases (Arostegui, 2000). Sherbrooke further refined Slay's algorithm in 
1986 and published it in an article in Operations Research titled "VARI-METRIC: 
Improved Approximations for Multi-Indenture, Multi-Echelon Availability Models." 
VARI-METRIC. The METRIC models are known as first-order models because they 
use simple averages to compute the number of units in the pipeline. VARI-METRIC is 
known as a second-order model because it uses both the mean and variance to compute 
the number of units in resupply. The network is the same as the Mod-METRIC model 
depicted in Figure 7. 
VARI-METRIC is a stationary, stochastic demand model that deals with multi- 
echelon, multi-item, multi-location, multi-indenture systems. Its goal is to maximize 
system-wide aircraft availability. It assumes an (S-l, S) inventory policy at every 
echelon. As was the case with METRIC, repair capacity and parts are plentiful so repair 
time is independent of the number of units already in repair. It assumes a Poisson 
demand with a mean that is constant, but uses the negative binomial distribution for the 
base backorder process. No units are condemned, and no lateral resupply occurs between 
bases. The chart below shows the difference between the Poisson and negative binomial 
distributions. The negative binomial approximates the backorder distribution in a more 
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Figure 8: Negative Binomial vs. Poisson (Arostegui, 2000) 
Dyna-METRIC. Peacetime flight operations provide a fairly stationary demand 
pattern for which to model inventory systems. The military environment, however, 
possesses several dynamic factors that necessitate the addition of dynamic processing 
capabilities. Wartime aircraft flying rates and support capabilities may fluctuate rapidly 
during a conflict. In addition, deploying aircraft usually leave some organic maintenance 
and resupply capabilities behind, and these take some time to "catch up" to the aircraft. 
Dyna-METRIC was developed to address these issues. The RAND organization 
developed a series of projects aimed at improving aircraft readiness and supportability, 
and these were used to develop and enhance the Dyna-METRIC model. Various releases 
of the model have been designed to support specific Air Force requirements. The first 
four releases were analytical models, while the last two are simulation-based. The 
analytical releases can assess the effect of different logistics scenarios, or compute spares 
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requirements to achieve specific availability goals. The simulation models can only 
provide assessments. 
The Dyna-METRIC model is a stochastic, dynamic demand model that deals with 
multi-item, multi-location, multi-echelon, multi-indenture systems and attempts to 
maximize aircraft availability. The next section lists the assumptions the Dyna-METRIC 
model makes. 
While similar to the METRIC models, Dyna-METRIC removes even more of the 
restrictive assumptions found in basic METRIC formulations. It assumes the LRU 
demands are proportional to either flying hours or sortie rate, and that demands arrive 
randomly based on some known mean and variance with either a Poisson or negative 
binomial distribution. In addition, repair and transportation times have known 
probability distributions, and there is unconstrained repair capability. Again, no lateral 
resupply takes place. All aircraft deployed to a single base are identical. In a major 
change to the previous METRIC models, cannibalization actions where holes in aircraft 
are consolidated are allowed. Dyna-METRIC assumes that "canns" occur instantly and 
that the ability to cann an LRU is either possible or not with no intermediate levels. 
The simulation releases of Dyna-METRIC relax some of the assumptions further. 
Lateral resupply is allowed, and repair scheduling can take place on a priority basis. In 
addition, depot condemnation is allowed and battle damage of repair facilities can be 
modeled. However, because the model is a simulation, it cannot build a spares 
requirements list to achieve target goals (Arostegui, 2000). 
Aircraft Sustainability Model (ASM). ASM was developed by LMI to provide a 
system-level approach in selecting spares mixes (Kline, et al, 1999: 1-2). ASM is a 
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stochastic, dynamic demand model that deals with multi-item, multi-location, multi- 
echelon, multi-indenture systems and attempts to maximize aircraft availability. It has 
the same assumptions as the Dyna-METRIC model. It also has the ability to both build 
an MRSP based on requirements and then evaluate that kit (or others) over a multi-day 
analysis period. 
Kline, et al (1999) list seven factors in addition to aircraft availability and budget 
restraints. The first is item type. ASM was primarily developed to deal with high-cost, 
essential items, usually reparable in nature. It can, however, deal with consumable item 
that are generally lower-cost, throw-away items. Second, ASM deals with the indenture 
structure of the aircraft by examining both LRU and SRU pipelines and determining the 
impact of each. Third, common items, which are used on more than one type of aircraft, 
are also considered. This allows ASM to consider the impact of a ready pool of available 
assets for other aircraft. This does not have as large an impact on MRSP calculations, 
however, because MRSPs assume no resupply from outside the operating location. The 
fourth factor is cannibalization. As we will discuss later, ASM can model the 
consolidation of needed parts into the fewest aircraft possible in several ways. 
The fifth factor ASM deals with is wartime vs. non-wartime conditions. Policies 
and flying hour requirements are vastly different during wartime than in peacetime. The 
sixth factor is the existence of starting stock where asset may already have been 
purchased. ASM incorporates these values into the shopping list for the optimal mix of 
spares. The final factor is a catchall that includes a number of item-specific factors such 
as demand rate, base and depot repair times, condemnation rates, and others (Kline, et al, 
1999: 1-4). Together, they make up the flexible and powerful package that is ASM. 
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MRSP Characteristics and Components 
The makeup of an MRSP is the result of a multitude of different factors. Policy 
decisions concerning flying rates and acceptable numbers of NMCS aircraft combine 
with known item factors to create an MRSP that is designed for a specific purpose. ASM 
uses these and other factors to compute an optimally sized kit that will support a unit for 
a specific cost at a specific availability level. This section will describe some of the most 
important factors and how ASM uses them to build an MRSP. 
Range and Depth. The assets in an MRSP have a range and a depth designed to 
support the unit. The range is the number of unique assets in the kit, and the depth is the 
total number of each unique asset. For example, an MRSP may have 1000 unique items 
(the range) but have 1200 total items because it has more than one of some items. AFR 
400-24 (War Reserve Policy) states that the composition of the MRSP is a product of the 
configuration, tasking, initial deployed maintenance capability, programmed arrival time 
of any planned follow-on maintenance units, and programmed supply support concepts 
for the specific MRSP (AFR 400-24: 24). When ASM uses these factors in the analysis, 
the range and depth are the result. 
Maintenance Concept. As previously discussed, assets may be divided into LRUs and 
SRUs. LRUs can be further divided into remove/replace (RR) or remove/repair/replace 
(RRR) items. The maintenance concept at the operating location determines how ASM 
treats the two types of LRUs. In particular, the concept of a CIRF is designed to allow 
RRR items to be repaired closer to the operating location and also to centralize the repair 
facilities and thus reduce the total number of SRUs in the system. Planners designing kits 
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using ASM must consider exactly what the maintenance capabilities of the operating 
location will be and what impact that will have on the depth of parts in the MRSP. 
Direct Support Objective. In the past, the direct support objective (DSO) was focused 
only on day 30 of the war. This was a result of a "consumable" outlook, which basically 
implied that having enough of an item on day 30 meant there was enough of the item on 
days prior to that (Mattern, 1993: 2-2). For reparable assets, however, this assumption 
may not be correct. A typical wartime scenario includes a "surge" period followed by a 
longer sustainment period, as shown in this example: 
Sorties per     55 
day per 50 
squadron 
25 
Sortie capability with DSO = 18 aircraft 
Tasking 
30 
Day of war 
Figure 9: Dual DSO Concept (Mattern, 1993: 2-4) 
As shown above, a DSO of 18 aircraft meets the requirement at day 30, but does not meet 
the requirement for the first eight days of the war. This prompted the Air Force to 
consider and adopt the concept of dual DSOs: one for the end of the surge period, and 
one for the sustainment period at the end of the war. ASM has the capability to use the 
dual DSO concept in its calculations. 
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The DSO directly affects the range and depth of spares in the MRSP. Reducing 
the DSO will reduce the number of spares purchased. This will also reduce the logistics 
footprint and airlift capacity needed to support the aircraft. The downside is that a when 
a DSO is reduced then the number of airframes available for mission planners is also 
reduced. Planners must determine the correct tradeoff that balances logistics footprint 
with mission success. DSOs vary by aircraft type and mission, and are defined in the 
War Mobilization Plan (WMP). 
Flying Hour Requirements. The WMP also defines the flying hour requirements for 
the unit undergoing analysis. ASM uses the total flying hours per day during both the 
surge and sustainment periods to determine what assets will be necessary. The heavier 
the flying hour requirement, the more parts will be needed to maintain the desired DSO 
for the period. 
Cannibalization. Cannibalization is a maintenance action taken when all other sources 
of parts have been exhausted. It involves removing items from one aircraft to place on 
another, and its effect is to consolidate "holes" in aircraft so more airframes are mission 
capable. Canning is an important consideration when running ASM because it is a real- 
world option and is used extensively during operations. Newer weapon systems such as 
the F-16 and F-15 have even been designed to make cannibalization easier (Arostegui, 
2000). This section will discuss some assumptions about canning and look at an 
example. 
ASM makes a number of assumptions with respect to cannibalization actions. 
First, it assumes that all cann actions take place at the operating base. No parts are 
canned from one aircraft at a base and then shipped to another base. Second, ASM 
27 
assumes items either may or may not be canned, with no regard to how easy or hard the 
cann action is. ASM has three options: cann all LRUs, cann LRUs according to their 
cann flag in the item properties, or do not cann any LRUs. ASM assumes that SRUs are 
always canned in the backshops when necessary (Kline, et al, 1999: 50). 
Cannibalization has a large impact on the range and depth of assets in the MRSP. 
In essence, it provides yet another warehouse for assets at the operating location, so if 
cannibalization is allowed the number of parts required will be reduced. It also relaxes 
the somewhat cumbersome assumption that only one part is missing from each NMCS 
aircraft. 
Item Characteristics. Every item ASM considers for inclusion in the MRSP has a set 
of factors that ASM uses to determine its optimal spares mix. Perhaps the most important 
factor is the daily demand rate of the item, which was discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Using the demand rate and repair cycle times, ASM can determine pipeline quantities. 
Depot variables such as the order and ship time (OST) and depot repair times are 
considered. Each item has a cannibalization flag (yes or no) and a quantity per aircraft 
(QPA) that tells ASM how many are needed and how many can be cannibalized if 
necessary. These and other factors are unique to each item and ASM takes each into 
account and balances them all to arrive at the solution. The final factor of interest to 
ASM is the item cost, which it uses to establish a shopping list which purchases items 
based on their contribution to aircraft availability (Kline, et al, 1999: 1-2). Planners use 
the list to purchase maximum aircraft availability for the allowable budget. For a more 
detailed examination of the item factors ASM uses, please see "Optimizing Spares 
Support: the Aircraft Sustainability Model," by Slay, et al (1999). 
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Centralized Inventory Management 
A relatively new idea known as risk pooling advocates the centralization of 
inventory to reduce overhead and inventory investment costs. There are three critical 
points to consider in a risk pooling scenario: 
1. Centralizing inventory reduces safety stock and average inventory. This point 
implies that if demand is high in one area of the market, then it usually is lower in 
another, so a centralized warehouse can reallocate assets faster than a non- 
centralized one. The military follows this concept to some extent, canceling 
lower-priority missions to sustain high operations tempo in other areas. 
2. The second point deals with the coefficient of variation, which is the standard 
deviation divided by the average demand (Simchi-Levi, et al, 2000: 57). The 
higher this coefficient is, the greater the benefit of risk pooling will be. This is 
due to the fact that safety stock calculations are almost always based on the 
standard deviation. The greater the reduction in safety stock, the greater the 
overall benefit will be. 
3. The final point is that the benefits of risk pooling depend on how highly 
correlated the demand in the markets are (Simchi-Levi, et al, 2000: 60). If the 
demands are highly correlated, then they will rise and fall together, and no offset 
of demand by reallocating assets will be possible. In a military setting, this would 
be equivalent to fighting a major theater war in both Asia and the Middle East at 
the same time. The reality for the near future is more likely that of small-scale 
contingencies in a few locations or a single major deployment covered by an 
AEF. 
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Bases currently stock MRSPs built for scenarios defined in the WMP, which are then 
adjusted before deployment for the actual scenario expected. Each base stocks and 
maintains their own kits. The risk pooling theory states that a centralized management 
facility with some portion of the total would result in reduced overhead and inventory 
investment while still maintaining the same level of support. The Navy recently used 
centralized management to accomplish this result. 
A Navy Example 
The Navy faces some of the same types of logistics footprint problems the Air 
Force does. They also face two additional problems: their ships have less warehouse 
space than the typical deployed location, and logistics response times are greater because 
the parts' destination is constantly moving. To improve the support for the Tomahawk 
Land Attack Missile (TLAM) Afloat Planning System (APS), the Navy turned to 
contractor logistics support. The Defense Logistics Agency and Federal Express 
(FEDEX) developed a logistics support system that significantly reduced costs while 
providing better support. The relevance to this thesis is that the improvement was 
accomplished through centralized inventory management and high-speed transit. 
The USS Carl Vinson was the test ship for the new system. Typically, the ship 
deployed with a range of 237 and a depth of 535 parts for the APS. This kit of spares 
was valued in excess of $1 million. Under the new system, the Carl Vinson deployed 
with 40 parts having a value of $ 195,818. All other parts are stored at a Government- 
Owned/Contractor Operated facility in Memphis, TN. The average transit time for parts 
requested via the internet from the central facility to the ship was 61/2 days; far better 
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than the published Navy time frame of 32 days. When the report we reviewed was 
published, nine afloat users and six ashore customers using the system had reported a 
total cost avoidance of $12,680,000. FEDEX maintains a 99% inventory accuracy rate 
and boasts an impressive 99% on-time delivery rate as well. Through this centralization 
of assets, the Navy has improved response time, reduced inventory, and increased afloat 
storage space (Navy Acquisition Reform Website, 2000). 
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III.  Chapter 3—Methodology 
Overview 
This chapter discusses the tools and techniques used to answer the central thesis 
question. It begins with a summary statement of the problem and then examines the data 
sets used to accomplish the analysis. It finishes with a discussion of the assumptions 
made, the scenarios used, and the use of the ASM model for the thesis question. 
Problem Summary 
The purpose of this research is to determine if centralized management of MRSP 
assets would result in an overall savings without sacrificing availability levels in the 
process. To simulate this, imagine two different deployments. In the first, two squadrons 
Operating Location 
Figure 10: Traditional vs. Proposed Management 
of aircraft deploy with their own individual MRSP to the same location and commence 
operations. There are two kits brought from different bases but having the same amount 
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of parts in each. In the second scenario, the two squadrons deploy to the same base, but 
their kit comes from a central location and is built to sustain both squadrons' aircraft at 
the same time. The figure above illustrates this. At first, it appears the added storage 
facility will increase costs, but it is important to remember that each base has a War 
Readiness Element staffed by supply personnel to manage the kits. Often, part-time 
personnel augment these elements, which reduces manpower in there primary sections as 
well. Additionally, this thesis will attempt to show that the inventory reductions gained 
by centralizing the kits are substantial and justify the setup costs of the central facilities. 
Data 
This research is focused at reducing the logistics footprint of deployed aircraft. 
As such, three different weapon system types were chosen to represent their roles: 
fighter, airlifter, and bomber. The F-15C, C-17A, and B-52H, respectively, were selected 
based on their typical wartime roles. MRSP data from the D087 database (used to build 
up all MRSPs) was obtained from HQ AFMC/XP. For the F-15C, kit data file 0D240AA 
was used. Kit file 1L2300A was used for the C-17A analysis. B-52H data came from the 
kit data file 1C060BA. The kit files are text files with both peacetime and wartime data 
for all items that might be assigned to an MRSP. They also include pre-specified buy 
quantities for items the Air Force has deemed essential to the MRSP. This quantity is 
flagged as the negotiated level quantity in ASM. Negotiated levels are set for some non- 
optimized (NOP) items, which are items that are required by the Air Force but not used in 
the optimization calculations. In addition, a generic run scenario is included with typical 
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settings for an MRSP calculation run. No changes were made to the raw data in the kit 
files. 
The actual range and depth for each MRSP was determined by ASM. The files 
include items which have pre-specifled quantities in the negotiated level field. Table 2 
shows the total number of items for which data is included, the range and depth of the 
items with negotiated levels, and the total cost of these parts. This total cost represents a 
floor below which ASM will not buy. 
Table 2: Negotiated Levels 
Aircraft Total Items Neg Lv Range Neg Lv Depth Total Neg Lv Cost 
F-15C 467 121 179 $6,960,610.92 
C-17A 233 13 443 $7,461,129.71 
B-52H 249 16 144 $10,240,071.85 
The F-15C kit has the most number of items for consideration, but the total negotiated 
level cost is lowest. The C-17A, the newest aircraft in the study, has the fewest total 
items but the depth of negotiated items is the greatest. The B-52H has the highest 
negotiated level cost of the three aircraft but the lowest negotiated level depth. 
Aircraft Sustainability Model 
The ASM program was installed on an Intel Celeron 400Mhz personal computer 
running Microsoft's Windows Millennium Edition. Version 6.21 of the software was 
used. ASM's interface is user-friendly and uses a database structure to manage the 
various runs. Radio buttons allow options to be turned on and off, and numerical data is 
entered in clearly labeled fields. Kit data is imported from the D087 raw file using the 
Kit-* Import Kit Data-* Import USAF D087 Data command. The proper kit is chosen 
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and ASM imports the data, converting it to ASM's file structure. An option to change 
baseline kit parameters such as the number of aircraft and the flying profile is offered, but 
was not used in this research. Changes to the flying profile and number of aircraft were 
made to each scenario run rather than to the baseline kit file. This allowed the file to be 
used for every run to maintain continuity of data. Once the baseline kit is created, the 
user can move on to creating scenarios and running requirements computations. 
Global Settings. Many options in ASM were set and then remained static throughout 
the runs for all aircraft. On the "Parameters" page, the Asset Projection field was 
changed to current and the Coverage Period was zero. Figure 11 shows the "Advanced 
Parameters" page, which was not changed once it was set: 
BBC: 
Figure 11: Advanced Parameters 
The starting assets field tells ASM to create a new kit without considering items that are 
already in Air Force inventory. The Pre-specified buy quantity field forces ASM to use 
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the negotiated levels discussed earlier. The Resupply fields force ASM to support the 
aircraft without depot repair and resupply, which is the whole purpose of the MRSP 
concept. In Other Options, exponential repair is more realistic and there is only one base 
to support. The Variance to Mean Ratio was kept at 1.0 and the model was asked to 
optimize the scenarios based on the expected number of aircraft NMCS at a certain day 
or days. 
Changing Variables. ASM has the option to run requirements for MRSPs based on 
the input variables, or run evaluations on a pre-built MRSP supporting different 
scenarios. We are examining the size and cost of kits for different scenarios, so the 
model was used to run requirements computations and build new kits. This section 
describes what variables were changed and why. 
ASM uses total flying hours as the primary driver of demands for items (Kline, et 
al, 1999: 2-13). The Scenario page allows the user to set the total flying hours for days 1- 
60 individually. This allows the establishment of surge and sustainment periods, or any 
other scenario the user wishes to evaluate. Figure 12 shows a sample scenario page 
(values shown are default values and were not used in the actual research). The Non- 
Wartime and Wartime fields are used when evaluating a pre-built MRSP and do not 
affect requirements computations. This was verified by making numerous requirements 
runs with different sortie rates and hours with no effect on the computed kit size. 
Wartime demands were not decelerated for any aircraft. The flying hour profile for the 
desired scenario is typed into the appropriate fields in the Wartime Flying Hours section. 
The final step was naming the run number for future reference and then running the 
requirements computation in ASM. 
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Figure 12: Scenarios Page 
One Base/Two Squadrons 
The first theoretical deployment considered was that of two squadrons deploying 
to the same location. In this case, baseline kits supporting 24 F-15C, 12 C-17A, and 12 
B-52H aircraft were imported. The wartime flying hours were adjusted to create eight 
different scenarios with a difference of 10 hours flying time between scenarios. The 
requirements run shopping lists were then exported in Microsoft Excel format and 
analyzed. The baseline kits were multiplied by two to simulate the arrival of two 
squadrons from different bases. This is based on the assumption that demand rates for 
the aircraft from different bases are the same. 
To simulate a customized MRSP arriving from a centralized management facility, 
an MRSP was created to support 48 F-15C, 24 C-17A, and 24 B-52H aircraft. The flying 
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hours were doubled for each of the eight scenarios and then requirement runs were 
created. The shopping lists were again exported to Excel and the differences between the 
two runs were examined. 
One important aspect of this scenario involves the impact of cannibalization on 
the reduction in parts. The scenarios were run with full cannibalization, but in the first 
case where each squadron brings its own kit the cannibalization occurs only within that 
squadron. Conversations with maintenance officers indicate that squadrons would allow 
cannibalization between squadrons if necessary. In the second case in which a kit for the 
total number of deployed aircraft is created, ASM assumes full cannibalization for the 
entire number of aircraft. The overall DSO remains the same, but there may be some 
change. To investigate, another series of runs identical to the first was made with the 
cannibalization flag switched to "none." 
Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) 
The second theoretical deployment involves the establishment of a CIRF 
supporting several smaller detachments of aircraft in a forward operating location (FOL). 
ASM version 6.21 has a preliminary CIRF analysis capability called the USAF FSL 
function. It must be activated by editing the model.ini file and changing the UserType 
field to UserType=USAFFSL. Once the model is restarted, the FSL option becomes 
available. ASM uses the term Forward Support Location (FSL) for the CIRF, and FOL 
for the bases in the FOL the aircraft are deployed to.  This terminology will be used for 
the remainder of the discussion. 
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The FSL option is undocumented so the AFLMA provided information on its use. 
It allows the assignment of pre-built MRSPs to FOLs and then calculates the parts 
required if some were stored at the FSL and some stored at the FOLs. The options 
available in the FSL page are shown in Figure 13 
St-ioct Kits 
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Figure 13: FSL Options 
The FSL to FOL ship time is the time it takes an item to travel from the FSL to the FOL, 
and ASM assumes this is equal for all FOLs. The default value of five days was used for 
all runs. Five days seemed to be a reasonable time frame and there was no conflicting 
documentation to suggest otherwise. The resupply time from the depot was also kept at 
the default 30 days. The FSL repair time assumes that some reduction in base repair 
capability occurs, so the FSL repairs items based on the items' base repair time (BRT) 
plus a constant. Again, the default value of two days was used. The LRU not-reparable 
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this station (NRTS) rate is assumed to be the same as the items base NRTS rate, but the 
SRU rate is set to 100% because the FSL does not have the same repair capabilities as a 
depot. Finally, the RR LRU support was set to Stock - RR items stocked but not repaired 
at FSL. 
The first page of the FSL option is the kit selection screen. Kits are deselected by 
filling in a small rectangle next to their name. Any unselected kits will be considered in 
the analysis. The FSL option assumes that each FOL receives a kit, so if four kits are 
assigned, then four FOLs will be assumed. For this situation we assumed the demands 
and flying schedules at each FOL were identical, so one baseline MRSP was created and 
then copied to produce the desired number of FOLs. After the run is made, ASM 
generates an Excel output file in the IAF_Port folder of the ASM directory. This file has 
four columns—NSN, fsl_target, folsumtarg, and tot_target. The fsl_target is the number 
of each NSN assigned to the FSL. The folsumtarg is the total number of items assigned 
to all the FOLs, and should be divided by the number of FOLs to determine how many 
parts go to each FOL. The tot_target column is the total number of parts to be purchased. 
The FSL output file NSNs are identical to the individual kit files, so when both 
are sorted by NSN it was a simple task to import the item cost and LRU/SRU flag. A 
template Excel file with the item data and LRU/SRU flags was created and the FSL 
option data was imported. Calculations for the FSL total cost and number of LRUs and 
SRUs were made. As in the first deployment considered, eight flying hour profiles were 
created. The FSL option scenarios were be compared to a deployment in which each 
squadron takes an individual MRSP with no intermediate repair facility. In this case, 
cannibalization was not an issue because the FOLs are separated geographically. 
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Once the scenarios were defined and ASM's parameters set to run requirements 
computations for MRSP assets, the shopping lists and FSL totals were exported to Excel. 
The data was manipulated to find total cost and reductions in total assets. The next 
chapter describes the data analysis in detail. 
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IV.  Chapter 4—Analysis 
Overview 
This chapter reports the results of using ASM to determine the effect of a 
theoretical centralized MRSP storage facility. The chapter is organized by aircraft type— 
F-15C, C-17A, and B-52H. Each section begins with a discussion of the flying hour 
scenarios for each aircraft and why they were chosen. The next section shows the unique 
ASM parameters that changed for each aircraft according to Air Force doctrine or 
mission specialty. Next, summarized ASM results for total cost, the range and depth of 
parts, and a breakdown of LRUs/SRUs are shown, as well as differences between the 
traditional deployment and the proposed centralized concepts. Finally, the same scenario 
results are shown with cannibalization turned off to show the effects canning has on the 
amount of assets in the MRSPs. 
There are two items of interest shown in the results tables. The first is total 
MRSP cost, which is reported by ASM and easily computed from the buy totals ASM 
outputs for each run. Cost is important because the military has insufficient funds to 
purchase all the assets it needs. Therefore, any cost savings resulting from the centralized 
MRSP concept are significant. The second item of interest is the range and depth of parts 
in the computed MRSPs, which directly affect the logistics footprint of the deployed 
squadrons. The percentages of LRUs and SRUs are reported as well, which may provide 
some insight into the makeup of the kits. 
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F-15C 
Flying Hour Profile Scenarios. The fighter aircraft representative has the highest 
number of assets under review for inclusion in the MRSP. Recall that the F-l 5C MRSP 
data contains both LRUs and SRUs, and some LRUs are RR or RRR. The flying hour 
profile for the aircraft was derived from the default values found in the D087 file. 
Fighter aircraft such as the F-15C face a surge period early in the deployment, and then a 
longer sustainment phase with fewer flying hours per day. For the F-15C, the surge 
period lasts 5 days and the sustainment period lasts until a pipeline is established at day 
30. Table 3 shows the eight scenarios used during the research for a 24-aircraft squadron. 
Day Seen. 1 Seen. 2 
—. - .j— 
Seen. 3 
B  
Seen. 4 Seen. 5 Seen. 6 Seen. 7 Seen. 8 
1-5 52 62 72 82 92 102 112 122 
6-30 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 95 
A single F-15C flying in scenario 1 would fly 2.17 hours per day, while scenario 8 would 
result in each aircraft flying 5 hours or per day during the surge period. The values for 
scenario 4 are the D087 default values. 
For the 48-aircraft scenarios, the flying hour profile values were doubled. Table 4 
shows the eight scenarios used for 48 aircraft: 
Tab le 4: *lyin 2 Hour Frc ifile tor 48 F-15C 
Day Seen. 1 Seen. 2 Seen. 3 Seen. 4 Seen. 5 Seen. 6 Seen. 7 Seen. 8 
1-5 104 124 144 164 184 204 224 244 
6-30 50 70 90 110 130 150 170 190 
The flying hour profiles result in the same sortie rates and hours as the 24-aircraft 
scenarios. The scenarios place the same demands on the aircraft, and thus the parts in the 
MRSPs, as two squadrons deploying with their own kits. The next section describes the 
ASM parameters unique to runs involving the F-l 5C. 
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ASM Parameters. The basic parameters page in ASM includes the Fleet Size, 1st 
Analysis Day, and 2nd Analysis day fields. For the first set of runs, the Fleet Size was 
set to 24 aircraft. The 1st Analysis day tells ASM what DSO the MRSP should support at 
the end of the surge period, and the 2nd Analysis day does the same at the end of the 
support period. For the F-15C, the default values from D087 were used. The 1st 
Analysis day is day 5 and the DSO is 71.66%, or 17.2 available aircraft at the end of day 
5. The 2nd Analysis day is day 30 with a DSO of 63.33%, or 15.2 aircraft available at 
the end of day 30. For the second set of runs with 48 aircraft, the DSO percentages 
remained the same, which changed the 1st Analysis availability goal to 34.4 aircraft and 
the 2nd Analysis day goal to 30.4. Cannibalization was set to "Full" for this set of runs. 
Results with Cannibalization. The first data set to report is the case of two 24-aircraft 
squadrons deploying with their own MRSPs. 
Table 5: Two 24 F-15C MRSPs 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $16,621,552.16 $18,430,770.58 $21,063,598.44 $23,084,285.82 $25,713,813.70 $29,454,300.14 $33,024,477.90 $38,264,945.20 
Range 142 154 167 176 189 208 218 237 
Depth 556 658 780 906 1066 1234 1438 1650 
% LRUs 81.29% 84.19% 86.67% 88.08% 87.80% 87.68% 87.48% 87.15% 
% SRUs 18.71% 15.81% 13.33% 11.92% 12.20% 12.32% 12.52% 12.85% 
%RR 76.62% 80.24% 83.33% 85.21% 85.37% 85.58% 85.54% 85.33% 
% RRR 23.38% 19.76% 16.67% 14.79% 14.63% 14.42% 14.46% 14.67% 
The next table shows the results of a custom MRSP designed to support all 48 
aircraft: 
Table 6: One 48 F-15C MRSP 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $10,954,161.19 $13,002,477.03 $15,577,981.39 $17,729,979.29 $20,542,407.13 $22,909,961.25 $26,075,228.17 $29,395,736.62 
Ranqe 170 185 198 212 223 232 247 255 
Depth 430 543 672 802 947 1090 1248 1418 
% LRUs 87.91% 90.42% 92.26% 93.52% 93.77% 93.94% 93.51% 92.74% 
% SRUs 12.09% 9.58% 7.74% 6.48% 6.23% 6.06% 6.49% 7.26% 
%RR 84.88% 88.03% 90.33% 91.90% 92.40% 92.75% 92.47% 91.82% 
% RRR 15.12% 11.97% 9.67% 8.10% 7.60% 7.25% 7.53% 8.18% 
Note again that the only item changed between the two sets of runs (for 24 and 48 
aircraft) is the number of aircraft assigned to the base. The flying hours were doubled, so 
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each aircraft flies the same profile in each scenario. Table 7 shows the differences in 
total cost and total assets in the kits. 
Table 7: F-15C Scenario Differences 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $5,667,390.97 $5,428,293.55 $5,485,617.05 $5,354,306.53 $5,171,406.57 $6,544,338.89 $6,949,249.73 $8,869,208.58 
Total Parts 126 115 108 104 119 144 190 232 
The difference in total cost decreases from scenarios 1 to 5, but then quickly increases to 
$8.8 million by scenario 8. Likewise, the number of parts in the kit decreases to scenario 
5 and then nearly doubles by scenario 8. The customized MRSP from the centralized 
storage area is cheaper and smaller than two kits from different bases in every scenario. 
To test the effects of cannibalization on the reduction in assets, the scenarios were run 
again with cannibalization turned off. 
Results without Cannibalization. Tables 8 and 9 show the results after the 
cannibalization flag was switched to "none:" 
Table 8: Two 24 F-15C MRSPs without Cannibalization 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $36,719,614.08 $44,703,751.20 $51,611,771.86 $57,976,595.82 $64,994,490.66 $71,985,193.90 $78,273,351.12 $84,570,415.02 
Range 384 389 393 394 395 396 396 396 
Depth 1904 2300 2614 2960 3288 3566 3880 4182 
% LRUs 85.08% 85.91% 86.46% 87.16% 87.90% 88.50% 88.25% 88.57% 
% SRUs 14.92% 14.09% 13.54% 12.84% 12.10% 11.50% 11.75% 11.43% 
%RR 82.67% 83.39% 84.01% 84.80% 85.40% 85.98% 85.82% 86.18% 
% RRR 17.33% 16.61% 15.99% 15.20% 14.60% 14.02% 14.18% 13.82% 
Table 9: One 48 F-15C MRSP without Cannibalization 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $24,179,229.87 $30,303,388.87 $36,423,489.40 $42,279,930.59 $48,145,633.95 $54,040,210.22 $59,966,720.05 $65,576,753.82 
Ranqe 388 391 393 396 396 396 396 396 
Depth 1327 1655 1946 2228 2495 2765 3023 3281 
% LRUs 87.04% 87.61% 88.28% 88.87% 89.30% 89.58% 89.91% 90.06% 
% SRUs 12.96% 12.39% 11.72% 11.13% 10.70% 10.42% 10.09% 9.94% 
%RR 84.85% 85.56% 86.18% 86.76% 87.09% 87.41% 87.66% 87.90% 
% RRR 15.15% 14.44% 13.82% 13.24% 12.91% 12.59% 12.34% 12.10% 
The differences between the two kits are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10: F-15C Differences without Cannibalization 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $12,540,384.21 $14,400,362.33 $15,188,282.46 $15,696,665.23 $16,848,856.71 $17,944,983.68 $18,306,631.07 $18,993,661.20 
Total Parts 577 645 668 732 793 801 857 901 
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In this case, there is still a sizeable savings gained with the development of a customized 
MRSP. While much larger than the standard MRSPs, the centralized management 
MRSPs still show a reduction in cost and footprint. 
F-15C CIRF Analysis 
Flying Hour Profiles. Chapter three discussed the application of ASM's FSL option to 
the F-15C. This section reports the results of that analysis. The CIRF option was 
designed for a scenario in which several small groups of aircraft are deployed throughout 
a region of conflict. 24-aircraft groups were judged to be too large for a reasonable 
analysis. A scenario with four 12-aircraft groups was designed. The total number of 
deployed aircraft remains at 48. The flying hour profiles were originally reduced by half 
from the 24-aircraft profiles, but this was judged to be too low for surge operations. The 
final flying hour profiles are shown in Table 11: 
Table 11:12 F-15C CIRF Flying Hour Profiles 
Day Seen. 1 Seen. 2 Seen. 3 Seen. 4 Seen. 5 Seen. 6 Seen. 7 Seen. 8 
1-5 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 
6-30 17.5 27.5 37.5 47.5 57.5 67.5 77.5 87.5 
Scenario 1 involves a single aircraft flying 2.6 hours per day, and scenario 8 brings that 
up to two 8.4 hours per day. The DSO at day five remained at 71.66%. The CIRF 
section of chapter three discusses the other parameters. 
Results with Cannibalization. The first set of data is the kit cost, depth, and range of 
four individual MRSPs deployed with four 12-aircraft squadrons with no CIRF 
established. Table 12 shows the results. 
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Table 12: Four 12 F-15C MRSPs with No CIRF 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $38,423,127.36 $49,337,072.88 $61,574,682.16 $78.766,945.88 $98,716,792.04 $117,668,401.72 $135,124,065.80 $154,640,818.40 
Range 151 205 234 271 297 317 323 329 
Depth 1292 1664 2056 2528 2960 3400 3812 4168 
The next table shows the results of the establishment of a CIRF supporting the four FOLs 
with 12 F-15C aircraft at each location. 
Table 13: 48 F-15C with CIRF Results Summary 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $6,008,128.37 $13,434,730.61 $22,692,881.27 $34,584,379.13 $47,299,079.13 $59,761,802.43 $70,221,877.35 $81,995,891.91 
Total Parts 240 532 805 1178 1470 1733 2023 2189 
Table 14: CIRF vs. Four 12 F-15C Kits 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $32.414,998.99 $35,902,342.27 $38,881,800.89 $44,182,566.75 $51,417,712.91 $57,906,599.29 $64,902,188.45 $72,644,926.49 
FSL Range 47 47 48 48 48 48 48 49 
FSL Depth 52 52 55 54 58 59 65 71 
FOL Range 92 101 118 127 142 161 171 189 
FOL Depth 1000 1080 1196 1296 1432 1608 1724 1908 
Total Range 139 '   -.            148 165 .;<.■■.•   ■       174 189 208 218 236 
Total Depth 1052 m;» 'üiW1i32 1251 m             1350 1490 1667 1789 -    .1979 
The savings resulting from the CIRF concept quickly rise as the flying hours increase. 
By scenario 6, two CIRFs supporting 96 aircraft could be established for the cost of four 
12-aircraftkits. 
Table 15 shows the breakdown of assets by LRU and SRU for each concept. 
rable 15: F-15C LRU/SRU Totals 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
FSL LRUs 1000 1080 1199 1298 1438 1615 1737 1927 
FSL SRUs 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
FSL Total 1052 1132 1251 1350 1490 1667 1789 ,     1979 
4 Kit LRUs 1040 1280 1580 1964 2332 2760 3108 3440 
4 Kit SRUs 252 384 476 564 628 640 704 728 
4 Kit Total 1292; 1664 * —mm 2528 V    2960 3400 3812 4168 
It shows that ASM assigns only 52 SRUs to the CIRF no matter what the flying hour 
profile is, while the four kit totals steadily increase the number of SRUs. This is most 
likely due to the way ASM deals with CIRF implementation. The FSL cannot repair 
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SRUs, but it can and does repair a significant number of LRUs, and provides a risk 
pooling effect that reduces the total number of stocked items. 
C-17A 
Flying Hour Profile Scenarios. The C-17A is the representative cargo aircraft. While 
its role as a tactical airlifter holds some merit, the decision was made to model deployed 
C-17s acting in a strategic, long-range cargo role. This was the default D-87 scenario as 
well. The C-17 is expected to deploy supplies during the first days of the war, sustain 
deployed forces, and then redeploy forces home after hostilities end. There is usually too 
little airlift capacity, so the C-17 is tasked for as many hours as possible with no surge or 
sustainment period. The flying hour profile reflects this, as it is a constant number of 
hours from days 1 to 45. Table 16 shows the scenarios used for 12 deployed C-17s. 
Table 16: Flying Hour Profile for 12 C-17A 
Day Seen. 1 Seen. 2 Seen. 3 Seen. 4 Seen. 5 Seen. 6 Seen. 7 Seen. 8 
1-45 145 155 165 175 185 195 205 215 
Table 17 shows the scenarios used for 24 deployed C-17s. 
Table 17: Flying Hour Profile for 24 C-17A 
Day Seen. 1 Seen. 2 Seen. 3 Seen. 4 Seen. 5 Seen. 6 Seen. 7 Seen. 8 
1-45 290 310 330 350 370 390 410 430 
Again, the flying hours were doubled for the proposed centralized management concept. 
Scenario 1 results in a single aircraft flying 12.1 hours per day, and scenario 8 results in 
the aircraft flying 17.9 hours per day. 
ASM Parameters. For the first set of runs, the Fleet Size was set to 12 aircraft. For 
the C-17 A, the default values from D087 were used for the 1st Analysis day. No second 
48 
analysis day is needed because the kit is designed to support the aircraft through day 45 
of the war. The 1st Analysis day is day 45 and the DSO is 93.08%, or 11.17 available 
aircraft at the end of day 45. For the second set of runs with 24 aircraft, the DSO 
percentage remained the same, which changed the 1st Analysis availability goal to 22.34 
aircraft. Cannibalization was set to "Full" for this set of runs. 
Results with Cannibalization. The first data set to report is the case of two 12-aircraft 
squadrons deploying with their own MRSPs. 
Table 18: Two 12 C-17A MRSPs 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $190,856,354.62 $200,076,460.78 $209,532,417.50 $218,237,954.78 $226,719,260.36 $235,968,589.74 $243,965,689.66 $252,902,571.66 
Range 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
Depth 3250 3372 3464 3554 3640 3746 3856 3940 
% LRUs 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% SRUs 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
%RR 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% RRR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
The next table shows the results of a custom MRSP designed to support all 48 aircraft: 
Table 19 :One24C-17AMRSP 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $133,909,399.73 $141,895,202.35 $149,959,787.04 $157,579,551.48 $165,764,819.03 $173,406,904.20 $180,943,879.26 $189,050,774.61 
Range 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
Depth 2047 2127 2213 2302 2375 2454 2551 2631 
% LRUs 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% SRUs 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
%RR 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% RRR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Note again that the only item changed between the two sets of runs (for 12 and 24 
aircraft) is the number of aircraft assigned to the base. The flying hours were doubled, so 
each aircraft flies the same profile in each scenario. Table 20 shows the differences in 
total cost and total assets in the kits. 
Table 20: C-17A Scenario Differences 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $56,946,954.89 $58,181,258.43 $59,572,630.46 $60,658,403.30 $60,954,441.33 $62,561,685.54 $63,021,810.40 $63,851,797.05 
Total Parts 1203 1245 1251 1252 1265 1292 1305 1309 
The difference in total cost increases steadily with the flying hours. The number of assets 
in the kits also increases with flying hours. Note that because all the assets in the C-17A 
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kit are LRUs the cost savings is quite substantial when compared to the F-15C scenarios. 
The customized MRSP from the centralized storage area is cheaper and smaller than two 
kits from different bases in every scenario. To test the effects of cannibalization on the 
reduction in assets, the scenarios were run again with cannibalization turned off. 
Results without Cannibalization. Tables 21 and 22 show the results after the 
cannibalization flag was switched to "none:" 
Table 21: Two 12 C-17A MRSPs without Cannibalization 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $205,611,405.06 $215,620,347.14 $224,848,513.18 $234,003,185.20 $243,260,714.64 $253,034,373.08 $260,821,778.64 $269,711,086.64 
Range 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
Depth 3402 3514 3610 3708 3816 3922 4026 4126 
% LRUs 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% SRUs 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
%RR 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% RRR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Table 22: One 24 C-17A MRSP without Cannibalization 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $156,634,831.36 $164,725,735.75 $173,022,913.09 $181,470,954.69 $188,777,630.36 $196,634,521.04 $204,236,590.00 $211,956,869.24 
Range 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
Depth 2306 2393 2478 2567 2646 2744 2824 2907 
% LRUs 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% SRUs 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
%RR 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% RRR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
The differences between the two kits are shown in Table 23. 
Table 23: F-15C Differences without Cannibalization 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $48,976,573.70 $50,894,611.39 $51,825,600.09 $52,532,230.51 $54,483,084.28 $56,399,852.04 $56,585,188.64 $57,754,217.40 
Total Parts 1096 1121 1132 1141 1170 1178 1202 1219 
The C-17A's very high DSO of 93.08 keeps the cost and asset totals high even with 




Flying Hour Profile Scenarios. The B-52H is the bomber aircraft representative. The 
flying hour profile for the aircraft was derived from the default values found in the D087 
file. The B-52H file has a surge period of 21 days and a sustainment period from 22 to 
30 days. The sustainment period involves only slightly fewer flying hours than the surge 
period. Table 24 shows the eight scenarios used during the research for a 12-aircraft 
squadron. 
Table 24: Flying Hour Profile for 12 B-52H 
Day Seen. 1 Seen. 2 Seen. 3 Seen. 4 Seen. 5 Seen. 6 Seen. 7 Seen. 8 
1-21 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 104 
22-30 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 102 
A single B-52H flying in scenario 1 would fly 2.83 hours per day, while scenario 8 would 
result in each aircraft flying 8.67 hours or per day during the surge period. The values for 
scenario 4 are the D087 default values. 
The flying hour profile values were doubled for the 24-aircraft scenarios. Table 
25 shows the eight scenarios used for 24 aircraft: 
Table 25: Flying Hour Profile for 24 B-52H 
Day Seen. 1 Seen. 2 Seen. 3 Seen. 4 Seen. 5 Seen. 6 Seen. 7 Seen. 8 
1-21 68 88 108 128 148 168 188 208 
22-30 64 84 104 124 144 164 184 204 
The flying hour profiles result in the same sortie rates and hours as the 12-aircraft 
scenarios. The scenarios place the same demands on the aircraft, and thus the parts in the 
MRSPs, as two squadrons deploying with their own kits. The next section describes the 
ASM parameters unique to runs involving the B-52H. 
ASM Parameters. For the first set of runs, the Fleet Size was set to 12 aircraft. The 
default DSO values from D087 were kept. The 1st Analysis day is day 5 and the DSO is 
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83.33%, or 10 available aircraft at the end of day 5. The 2nd Analysis day is day 30 with 
a DSO of 83%, or 9.96 aircraft available at the end of day 30. For the second set of runs 
with 24 aircraft, the DSO percentages remained the same, which changed the 1st 
Analysis availability goal to 20 aircraft and the 2nd Analysis day goal to 19.92. 
Cannibalization was set to "Full" for this set of runs. 
Results with Cannibalization. The first data set to report is the case of two 12-aircraft 
squadrons deploying with their own MRSPs. 
Table 26: Two 12 B-52H MRSPs 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $55,603,684.38 $73,801,789.52 $91,279,628.96 $108,262,458.42 $125255,913.90 $140,862,568.36 $157,852,609.58 $173,144,278.40 
Range 232 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 
Total Parts 1794 2172 2502 2816 3152 3452 3778 4048 
% LRUs 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
% SRUs 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
%RR 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
% RRR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
The next table shows the results of a custom MRSP designed to support all 24 
aircraft: 
Table 27: One 24 B-52H MRSP 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $30,954,389.23 $46,177,275.49 $61,087,98150 $75,824,571.78 $90,510,852.47 $104,639,332.74 $119,336,426.39 $134,069,997.49 
Ranqe 154 179 189 200 206 210 213 216 
Total Parts 635 886 1139 1398 1645 1895 2146 2397 
% LRUs 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
% SRUs 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
%RR 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
% RRR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Note again that the only item changed between the two sets of runs (for 12 and 24 
aircraft) is the number of aircraft assigned to the base. The flying hours were doubled, so 
each aircraft flies the same profile in each scenario. Table 27 shows the differences in 
total cost and total assets in the kits. 
Table 28: B-52H Scenario Differences 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $24,649,295.15 $27,624,514.03 $30,191,647.46 $32,437,886.64 $34,745,061.43 $36,223,235.62 $38,516,183.19 $39,074,280.91 
Total Parts 1159 1286 1363 1418 1507 1557 1632 1651 
52 
The difference in total cost increases steadily from scenario 1 to scenario 8. Likewise, 
the number of parts in the kit increases as flying hours increase. The customized MRSP 
from the centralized storage area is cheaper and smaller than two kits from different bases 
in every scenario. To test the effects of cannibalization on the reduction in assets, the 
scenarios were run again with cannibalization turned off. 
Results without Cannibalization. Tables 29 and 30 show the results after the 
cannibalization flag was switched to "none:" 
Table 29: Two 12 B-52H MRSPs without Cannibalization 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $85,101,265.94 $103,719,237.58 $121,704,174.62 $139,018,863.98 $156,077,188.68 $172,835,975.68 $189,533,000.08 $205,849,42420 
Ranqe 234 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 
Total Parts 2412 2782 3168 3500 3838 4160 4480 4768 
% LRUs 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
% SRUs 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
%RR 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
% RRR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Table 30: One 24 B-52H MRSP without Cannibalization 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $65,955,450.75 $82,235,146.65 $98,023,726.43 $113,483,15826 $128,722,331.75 $144,172,41522 $158,673,674.44 $173,474,798.89 
Ranqe 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 
Total Parts 1712 2020 2310 2593 2884 3155 3417 3689 
% LRUs 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
%SRUs 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
%RR 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
% RRR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
The differences between the two kits are shown in Table 31. 
Table 31: B-52H Differences without Cannibalization 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
Total Cost $19,145,815.19 $21,484,090.93 $23,680,448.19 $25,535,705.72 $27,354,856.93 $28,663,560.46 $30,859,325.64 $32,374,625.31 
Total Parts 700 762 858 907 954 1005 1063 1079 
As with the other aircraft, there is a sizeable savings gained with the development of a 
customized MRSP. While much larger than the standard MRSPs, the centralized 
management MRSPs computed without cannibalization still show a reduction in cost and 
footprint. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Overview 
The need to reduce MRSP size and cost has never been greater. Air Force units 
are being tasked to support contingencies around the world, and the speed and range of 
airlift has made it the transport of choice. This thesis has examined a unique approach to 
reducing the spares requirements of deployed squadrons. This chapter will present the 
conclusions based on Chapter IV ASM analysis and examine some aspects of the 
research that may have affected the results. It concludes with suggestions for future 
research in this area. 
Conclusions 
Various scenarios involving multiple squadrons of aircraft from separate bases 
were used to test the concept of the centralized MRSP management facility. The idea 
that customizing the MRSPs could produce some sort of economies of scope was the 
basic premise behind this testing methodology. We found, for the MRSP files analyzed, 
there is a significant reduction in total cost and total assets needed to support the same 
flying profile requirements. Table 32 summarizes the percent decrease in cost and parts 
required for each aircraft. 
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Table 32: Percent Savings 
Aircraft % Cost % Parts 
F-15C 24.9 14.5 
C-17A 27.5 35.2 
B-52H 30.7 50.7 
The average savings for the F-15C was $6.2 million and 142 parts over the eight 
scenarios. Savings for the C-17A averaged $60.7 million and 1,265 parts, and the B-52H 
averaged $32.9 million for 1,447 parts. These savings are quite significant, especially for 
the C-17A and B-52H, where every asset in the MRSP is an LRU. Many LRUs are 
expensive, and thus are in limited supply. These results show that establishment of a 
centralized facility will allow more LRUs to be pushed back out to the individual bases 
for operating stock, while still providing optimal support to deployed units supported by 
customized MRSPs. 
Cannibalization is a major factor affecting the size and cost of the MRSPs. The 
ASM analysis shows the kit size increases when cannibalization is not allowed, but the 
savings resulting from centralized management are still present. Table 33 shows the 
percent savings of the analysis without cannibalization. 
Table 33: Percent Savings without Cannibalization 
Aircraft % Cost % Parts 
F-15C 27.5 24.9 
C-17A 22.6 30.8 
B-52H 18.4 25.6 
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The average savings for the F-15C jumped to $16.2 million and 747 parts. The C-17A 
and B-52H showed slight drops in average savings at $53.7 million and 1,157 parts and 
$26.1 million at 916 parts, respectively. These results show that even without the aircraft 
availability gained by cannibalization a customized MRSP targeted for the exact number 
of deployed aircraft will yield the same support at a lower cost and size than would an 
MRSP managed in the traditional manner. 
The F-15C FSL analysis shows an even more impressive result. Figure 14 shows 
a plot of the cost of four individual MRSPs and the plot of the FSL, or CIRF option. 
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Figure 14: CIRF vs. 4 Kits 
The triangle-marked line in Figure 14 is the difference between the two concepts. 
Around scenario 6, the cost to send four MRSPs to the FOL is more than twice as 
expensive as the establishment of a CIRF. Essentially, 96 aircraft could be supported by 
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two CIRFs for the cost of supporting only 48 aircraft with individual MRSPs. If a CIRF 
support concept is the expected support option for an AEF deployment, then a centralized 
MRSP management facility would be able to quickly build up and deploy the FOL and 
FSL packages for the entire region. 
Factors Affecting Research 
Perhaps the largest factor affecting the research was the use of raw D087 MRSP 
files for the starting point of the ASM runs. The F-15C data included LRUs and SRUs in 
both the RR and RRR types. ASM uses these values to determine what items can be 
repaired at the FSL and where to stock them. The C-17A and B-52H MRSP files did not 
have any items that the FSL option could evaluate, so no CIRF analysis could be 
accomplished on those aircraft. If military planners decide a CIRF support plan is an 
option for the C-17 and B-52, then different data files will be needed to run a proper 
analysis. 
Another difficulty faced when using the FSL option was the undocumented nature 
of the option. The current version of ASM does not have a fully implemented FSL 
capability. As such, no information about exactly how the option functions was 
available. Agencies such as AFLMA and LMI are using the option, so it was believed to 
be useful to this research. Results should be viewed with the understanding that a final 
implementation may affect the outcome. 
Unfortunately, not every flying hour scenario could be run in the limited amount 
of time the research was accomplished. Different surge and sustainment periods and 
even different DSO figures may show larger or smaller cost savings. The research did 
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include three general types of flying profiles: high surge/low sustainment (F-15C), 
steady-state (C-17A), and high surge/slightly lower sustainment (B-52H). In all cases, 
the custom MRSPs showed cost and size reductions. This leads us to suspect that 
different scenarios will show varying degrees of savings, but rarely, if ever, increased 
cost or size. 
Future Research 
This thesis examined a groundbreaking concept by supporting MRSPs through 
centralized management. No information about centralized MRSP management was 
found during the literature review. Conversations with other researchers and supply 
managers did not indicate that any research efforts had been aimed at exploring the 
options. As a result, there are numerous avenues for expanding the research in this area. 
One area mentioned briefly in this thesis but not pursued was the savings in 
manpower costs and overhead by removing the WRM elements at the base supply level. 
Assets are constantly moving in and out of non-deployed MRSPs due to their higher 
priority level. This keeps a large percentage of personnel busy replenishing, 
inventorying, and issuing parts from the kits. In addition, the large containers used to 
house the assets consume valuable warehouse space. A real-world survey and cost 
analysis of the operating overhead required by such facilities would provide further 
insight into the viability of centralized MRSP management. 
Another potential area for research is the examination of optimal placement of the 
centralized management facility (or facilities). Some discussions have suggested the 
facility be placed at the depot for whatever aircraft is being supported. Others suggest 
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regional centers based on geographic locations, such as east coast, west coast, USAFE, 
and PACAF. Another idea is to support multiple types of aircraft from one "superkit," 
where the airlift support comes through and picks up all the assets needed for aircraft 
deployed in the region of conflict. 
This thesis was a theoretical exercise. While actual demand data was used for the 
runs, the scenarios used did not specify bases or actual real-world flying scenarios. Data 
on flying hours/mission profiles from real-world operations or exercises may be the next 
step in the research. In addition, use of actual base demand data and the number of real- 
world MRSPs for each aircraft type would contribute greatly to the understanding of the 
usefulness of the centralized concept. 
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■ Aerospace Expeditionary Force 
• Air Force Logistics Management Agency 
Air Force Regulation 
Afloat Planning System 
- Aircraft Sustainability Model 
Base Repair Time 
Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility 
Daily Demand Rate 
Depot Repair Time 
Direct Support Objective 
Expected Backorders 
Economic Order Quantity 
Forward Operating Location 
Forward Support Location 
General Accounting Office 
Logistics Management Institute 
Line-Replaceable Unit 
Multi-Echelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control 
Military Operations Other Than Warfare 
Mobility Readiness Spares Package 
Major Theater War 
Non-Optimized 
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NMCS ~ Not Mission Capable-Supply 
NRTS ~ Not Repairable This Station 
OST - Order and Ship Time 
PACAF — Pacific Air Forces 
PBR -- Percent Base Repair 
PLQ — Pipeline Quantity 
POS -- Peacetime Operating Stock 
QPA ~ Quantity Per Aircraft. 
RCQ ~ Repair Cycle Quantity 
RET ~ Retrograde Time 
RCT ~ Repair Cycle Time 
RTS — Repaired This Station 
SRU ~ Shop-Replaceable Unit 
TLAM ~ Tomahawk Land Attack Missile 
TSR — Total System Requirement 
USAFE — US Air Forces Europe 
WMP ~ War and Mobilization Plan 
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